Two disputes of methods, three constructivisms, and three liberalisms by Yefimov, V. M.
29V. M. Yefimov
ЭКОНОМИКА РЕГИОНА № 1 (2015)
plementation of a well-known argument «With an 
iron hand we shall drive mankind to happiness» 
which will inevitably lead to consequences that 
are well-known, too. 
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TWO DISPUTES OF METHODS, THREE CONSTRUCTIVISMS,  
AND THREE LIBERALISMS  1 
Part I
The paper proposes to reconsider the methodology and history of economics radically, whether present 
day mainstream or heterodox versions of it. The profession of economists must definitely abandon Cartesian 
dualism and adopt Vygotskian constructivism. In fact constructivist economics already existed in the past 
1 © Yefimov V. M. Text. 2015.
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and was cognitively very successful and socially very useful. It was the economics of Gustav Schmoller’s his-
torico-ethical school and the institutionalist economics of John R. Commons, traditions of which are totally 
ignored by the contemporary community of economists. The former tradition was based on Dilthey’s herme-
neutics and the latter on Peirce’s pragmatism. It is worth to underline that hermeneutics and pragmatism 
are both predecessors of Vygotskian constructivism. During the last two decades a lot was written by econo-
mists on pragmatist, constructivist and discursive approaches to the methodology and history of economics, 
but those who wrote on these topics viewed them from the dualistic point of view. 
My paper is an appeal to economists to reconsider Methodenstreit. The dispute of methods between 
Schmoller and Menger can be considered as a repetition of a similar dispute taking place more than two 
hundred years earlier between Robert Boyle and Thomas Hobbes. Schmoller-Menger dispute started soon af-
ter the beginning of the institutionalisation of experimentally-oriented economics which happened with the 
creation in 1873 of the Vereinfür Sozialpolitik. Boyle-Hobbes dispute started in 1660, when the Royal Society 
of London had been founded, the cradle of the institution of science. Schmoller was one of the creators of the 
Verein, and Boyle was one of the founders of the Royal Society. The activities of both societies were similar in 
several respects: they represented efforts to collect data, working out of detailed reports and collective evalu-
ation of obtained results. For Hobbes, as for Menger, the model of ‘science’ was geometry. Boyle and Schmoller 
privileged collecting and analysing data. Boyle did win the dispute, Schmoller did loose. It happened because 
of different attitudes of powerful groups in societies towards natural scientific experimental research and ex-
perimental social research. They were interested in the former, and they saw much more danger than bene-
fit for them in the latter. On the contrary, they were interested in abstract theoretical constructions justify-
ing the market vision of society and laissez-faire. This kind of constructions corresponded to deeply enrooted 
scholastic traditions of European universities to teach theology and linked with it philosophy. In the frame-
work of these traditions, mathematics was considered as a summit of the scientific approach. 
On the one hand, the adoption of constructivism by economists would turn their discipline into a science 
functionally close to natural sciences. On the other hand the Vygotskian constructivism, as a social and po-
litical philosophy, once accepted by economists, may lead them to become preachers of the communitarian 
liberalism with its emphasis on social responsibility, deliberative democracy, and discourse ethics. 
Keywords: Methodenstreit; social constructivism; constructivist epistemology and ontology for economics; con-
structivist history of economics; economic policy and deliberative democracy; economic philosophy and discourse 
ethics, communitarian liberalism
1. Constructivism vs. dualism
I think that it could hardly be contested that 
the present day economics, whether mainstream 
or heterodox, is impregnated with Cartesian dual-
ism. The dualist vision of scientific research may 
be presented in the following way: 
According to the dualistic tradition, mutually 
excluding doctrines were developed such as em-
piricism-rationalism and materialism-idealism. 
For a century and a half, economics claims to be 
a science having natural sciences as a model. It 
used in this claim the dualist vision of scientific re-
search. This vision is based on the sharp separa-
tion of (research) object and subject (researcher), 
as well as on an individualistic character of the 
process of scientific research. Elements of this vi-
sion are: Research object, Researcher and Ideas/
Theories. Empiricism considers the links between 
these elements in following way: Research ob-
ject → Researcher → Ideas/Theories. Rationalism 
linked them differently: Researcher → Ideas/
Theories → Research object. Comte’s positivism 
hesitated between these two visions of scientific 
research that allowed John S. Mill to announce po-
litical economy an abstract and only abstract sci-
ence. Idealism saw the sequence of elements in a 
third way: Ideas/Theories → Research object → 
Researcher. Materialism turned the direction of ar-
rows in the opposite way. In spite of all these dif-
ferences, all these “isms” appealed to the same du-
alist vision of scientific research. Finally, the last 
characteristic, but apparently the most important 
feature of the Cartesian dualist vision of scientific 
research, was its individualism: the researcher was 
Fig. 1. The dualist vision of scientific research
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alone in his search for truth as a copy of reality. It is 
the dualist vision of scientific research which is at 
the basis of the so-called “scientific method”. For 
mainstream economists, this method is based on 
Karl Popper’s philosophy of science [1]and for het-
erodox economists its foundations can be found in 
Roy Bhaskar’s critical realism [2]. The constructiv-
ism opposes to both of them. 
Most economists totally ignore ideas of con-
structivism, but even those philosophers [3] and 
historians [4; 5] of economics, who studied litera-
ture on constructivism and tried to apply it to their 
publications, considered the constructivism from 
the dualist point of view. Bruno Latour and other 
specialists of Science Studies have shown that the 
dualist modernist vision of research never corre-
sponded to the realities of scientific research: “We 
have never been modern” [6]. They developed a 
new vision of scientific research, the elaboration 
of which has been based on historical and field 
studies of scientific practices in natural sciences 
[7; 8; 9; 10].
The constructivism rejects the dualist vision 
with all its dichotomies and “isms”. In this vision of 
scientific research the research object is not sepa-
rated from the researcher, but make together with 
the researcher and her/his ‘instruments’ an exper-
imental situation, and ideas and theories coming 
from observations/experiments are evaluated not 
by the individual researcher but by a community 
of evaluators consisting not only of members of 
the corresponding scientific community but of a 
larger community which includes administrators, 
politicians and concerned segments of the public. 
Evaluators can be divided into two categories: wit-
nesses and judges. The difference between them 
consists in their respective roles in the procedure 
of evaluation: the former only express their opin-
ion about evaluated ideas/theories, but the latter, 
taking into consideration these opinions or not, 
make decisions concerning destiny of ideas/the-
ories and future of experimental situation itself. 
Most of the members of scientific communities, 
except powerful members, belong to the category 
of witnesses. This vision does not challenge the 
objectivity of scientific research and does not lead 
to relativism. According to Latour, the specificity 
of scientific research does not consist in a special 
“scientific method”, but in the design of experi-
mental situation in which the object has the pos-
sibility to resist, “to object” to the ideas of the re-
searcher concerning it, “when things strike back” 
[11]. Application of this model to economics leads 
to the constructivist institutional economics [12; 
13] resulting in the switch from primarily theoret-
ical (a priori) type of research to experimental type 
of research, and from primarily quantitative tech-
niques to qualitative methods [14; 15]. Analysis of 
historical data (basically texts: laws, political dis-
courses, etc.), interviews, focus groups and ac-
tion research should become the core of econom-
ics research. This mode of research can bring val-
uable results only if the research is organized in 
such a way that the research object can resist to 
the ideas issued by the researcher about it. It is 
this kind of resistance which has allowed to econ-
omists of the German Historico-ethical School 
headed by Gustav Schmoller and the Wisconsin 
Institutionalism of John Commons to come to the 
understanding of socio-economic-political pro-
cesses in their countries, and elaborate on this ba-
sis propositions and legislative acts for the solu-
tion of the so-called “social question” at the turn 
of the 19th and 20th centuries. 
The term “constructivist epistemologies” 
was initially introduced by Jean Piaget who was 
convinced that it is possible to know an object 
only by acting on it and by transforming it [16, p. 
85]. These ‘acting’ and ‘transforming’ provoke ‘re-
sistance’ of the ‘object’ which is the ‘source’ of any 
knowledge about it. The researcher performs these 
‘acting’ and ‘transforming’ by mediation of cer-
tain instruments (see Fig. 3). In natural sciences, 
these instruments include not only material in-
struments but also all sorts of conventional signs. 
The inevitable mediation of socially created con-
ventional signs in the interaction between sub-
ject and object was underlined by another founder 
of constructivism, an opponent of Piaget, Lev 
Vygotsky. According to him “instead of acting in 
a direct, unmediated way in the social and physi-
cal world, our contact with the world is indirect or 
mediated by signs” [17, p. 178]. These signs could 
take the form of “language; various systems for 
counting; mnemonic techniques; algebraic sym-
bol systems; works of art; writing; schemes, dia-
grams, maps, and mechanical drawings” (Ibid.).
The Figure 3 is a slightly modified Vygotsky’s 
basic triangular representation of mediation [18, 
Fig. 2. The constructivist vision of scientific research
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p. 5]. It could seem that this figure express the be-
lief of MiltonFriedman that “we cannot perceive 
‘facts’ without a theory’, but it is not so. Many 
economists use the term ‘theory’ instead of the 
notion ‘vision’. Geoffrey Hodgson, who is one of 
the very active writers with ‘institutionalist la-
bel’, confessed: “Contrary to many institutional-
ist writers, the epistemological position here is 
strongly anti-empiricist” 1 [19, p. 24]. In his book 
he criticised Friedman not for his dualist positiv-
ism but on the basis of this ‘strongly anti-empir-
icist’ position (Ibid., pp. 28-35). Let us discuss his 
‘anti-empiricists’ arguments, which are indeed 
pro-Cartesian arguments: “The key criticism of 
empiricist epistemology … is that no observation 
can be independent of the conceptual framework, 
language and theoretical system of the observer. 
Consequently, no ‘objective’ facts can be known 
untainted by the preconceptions of the investiga-
tor” (Ibid., p. 35). I believe that Hodgson’s mistake 
is to consider “conceptual framework, language 
and theoretical system of the observer” almost as 
synonyms. Constructivist institutionalist investi-
gator before engaging in a field study has his con-
ceptual framework: she/he studies institutions 
(formal and informal rules) and beliefs linked to 
these rules. Nevertheless the statement “all facts 
are expressed in some form of language, and an 
a conceptual or a theoretical language is impossi-
ble” is a sophism because of the use of undefined 
here notions of ‘theory’ and ‘language’. ‘Theories’ 
and ‘languages’ in social studies can be of differ-
ent levels. The statement is true if the notions of 
‘language’ and ‘theory’ are used in the sense of 
categories shared in a certain socio-cultural lin-
guistic environment (low-level categories) which 
can be very large. For example, if the area under 
study was the Russian countryside, then knowl-
1 According to Hodgson, empiricism “boils down to the view 
that sense data, or ‘experience’, are the ultimate source of all 
knowledge” [19, p. 24]. It is a typically dualist statement.
edge of Russian language including technical agri-
cultural terms would be sufficient to begin ‘obser-
vation’, i.e. “getting close to the people involved 
in it, seeing it in a variety of situations they meet, 
noting their problems and observing how they 
handle them, being party to their conversations, 
and watching their life as it flows along” [20, p. 37].
At the same time the statement of Hodgson is 
false if the notions of ‘language’ and ‘theory’ are 
used in the sense of categories and models/the-
ories/hypotheses shared by a certain community 
of scholars. For example, gathering data concern-
ing preconceived quantitative variables used in a 
theory and escaping any other information, which 
could be collected in the field if it does not enter 
in this set of preconceived variables, will make in-
vestigator ‘blind’ to many possible insights. In the 
case of using low level categories shared by ac-
tors of the area under study the scholar has a pos-
sibility to make a discovery and to reconsider his 
pre-established image of the area under study by 
developing his own new categories (high-level 
categories). In the case of using high-level catego-
ries shared by members of a certain scientific com-
munity, a scholar, member of this community, is 
certainly dependant of the conceptual framework 
of the community. The potential validity of the in-
stitutionalist conceptual framework is based on 
the belief that social regularities come from so-
cially shared rules and beliefs. But this conceptual 
framework is not a model or theory but a vision 2. 
On the contrary, in case of the use of an a priori 
model or theory, the scholar is unable to discover 
in the field something outside of her/his a priori 
model/theory/hypothesis and what she/he can do 
only is to ‘test’ this a priori model/theory/hypoth-
esis. Geoffrey Hodgson is right by saying that “we 
cannot ever gain a more accurate or adequate un-
derstanding of economic reality exclusively by ob-
servation and the gathering of data” because un-
derstanding of economic reality can progress only 
through the construction of new or the correction 
of existing categories/concepts/theories on the 
basis of observation and gathering of data. I agree 
with professor Hodgson when, following the soci-
ology of science, he said that “science is a social ac-
tivity and its development involves the social gen-
eration, scrutinization and acceptance or rejection 
of theories, procedures and norms. Consequently, 
science can never be ‘neutral’ in the sense that it 
is entirely free of the biases and preoccupations of 
society and the scientific community” [19, p. 36].
Probably the Hodgson’s confusion between 
‘theory’ and ‘language’ comes from the practice 
2 Vision can be called also ‘frame theory’.
Fig. 3. The subject-object interaction in experimental situation
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of experimental physics. According to Prigogine 
and Stengers natural scientists have some kind 
of experimental dialogue with Nature. This di-
alogue “corresponds to a highly specific proce-
dure. Nature is cross-examined through experi-
mentation, as if in a court of law, in the name of 
a priori principles, Nature’s answers are recorded 
with utmost accuracy, but relevance of those an-
swers is assessed in terms of the very idealizations 
that guided the experiments. All the rest does not 
count as information but is idle chatter, negligible 
secondary effects” [21, p. 42]. It means that this 
dialogue is going on using the language of a the-
ory which “guides the experiment” (Ibid., p. 49). 
However unlike the Nature which can commu-
nicate with human being researcher only in lan-
guage of researchers’ theories, the actors, active 
objects of socio-politico-economic research, are 
also human beings, who can communicate with 
researchers not in language of researchers’ theo-
ries but in English, French or Russian which can 
be understood by both sides. It means that econ-
omists who transfer the practice of dialogue with 
Nature in natural sciences to practice of dialogue 
with Human beings commit a mistake. 
What Prigogine and Stengers are saying that 
quite often investigators of nature are forced to 
design their experiments as testing of some the-
ories? Some methodologists of economics un-
derstand potential dangers of this kind of test-
ing: “The first step in testing a scientific theory 
was to deduce certain empirical predictions from 
the theory and its initial conditions. The second 
step was to check these predictions against the 
observational evidence; if the empirical predic-
tions turned out to be true, the theory was con-
firmed, and if these predictions turned out to be 
false, the theory was disconfirmed. In either case, 
it was not induction, but rather the deductive con-
sequences of a scientific theory, which were rel-
evant to its empirical support … Hypothetico-
deductive method allowed scientific theories to 
be ‘based on’ empirical observations (deductively) 
without being ‘built up from’ those observations 
(inductively).” [22, p. 376]. In this way, the realism 
of research depends on a priori guessing of a real-
istic theory. In the case of simple systems, which 
were studied in classical physics, such guessing 
was probably possible. For more complex system, 
such guessing becomes very improbable. Systems 
studied by economic science are never simple, 
and that is why a priori theories do not have any 
chance to serve a basis for understanding of eco-
nomic phenomena. No testing of this kind of the-
ories would help: “Cut off from observation as a 
source of truth, the Cartesian mind puts great on 
‘testing’ to reaffirm its realism. But testing is not a 
guarantee of correct ideas because, having lost its 
mooring in reality, the economic mind has created 
so many conundrums, puzzles and purely men-
tal constructs that testing proves everything and 
nothing” [23, p. 41].
It is already more than ten years that I am 
writing on pragmatist, constructivist and discur-
sive approaches to the methodology and history 
of economics. It is true that last two decades a lot 
was written by economists on these subjects, but I 
think that those who wrote on these topics missed 
central characteristics of them. Economists did 
not take into consideration that the pragmatism, 
taking its origins from Charles Peirce, is a philoso-
phy that underlines experimental character of sci-
entific investigations and of human life in gen-
eral, and that any change in habits and beliefs is 
the result of ongoing experiments, which make 
together our lives. Economists did not understand 
that the successor of pragmatism, the social con-
structivism, launched by the book of Berger and 
Luckmann [24], is about construction of social re-
ality, which is reality of rules (as typification of ha-
bitualized actions) and beliefs legitimizing these 
rules. These rules and beliefs are emerging and 
changing through social interactions. If we take 
off experimental, interactive and communal treat-
ment of research and life in pragmatism and con-
structivism, then we lose the core of these teach-
ings. Many economists, following J. S. Mill, con-
tinue to think that economics should inevitably 
be an abstract science because ‘controlled’ experi-
ments in social sphere are impossible. But the no-
tion of ‘controlled’ experiments is closely linked 
with the notion of causality which is inappropri-
ate in this sphere 1. The search for causality should 
be substituted by the search of rules and beliefs 
which justify them. It can be made only on the 
basis of discursive approach. The discursive ap-
proach is wrongly reduced in the community of 
economists to the rhetoric used in economic theo-
ries. On the contrary in the framework of construc-
tivism, it is the discourses of actors which are con-
sidered. Such constructivist as Rom Harré claims 
that “the primary human reality is persons in con-
versations” [26, p. 58] and “there are only two hu-
man realities: physiology and discourse (conver-
sation) — the former an individual phenomenon, 
the latter collective” (Ibid., p. 345). He insists on 
1 «Using the language of causality to describe research methods 
and results can only distort and obscure what has been discov-
ered. At best it is a rhetorical device to make the work look more 
like physics. At worst it is barrier to the development of a truly 
scientific psychology» [25, p. 80].
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“the centrality of conversations in both social re-
ality and the study of that reality [25, p. 65].
At present the absolute majority of economists 
and many social scientists do not pay attention 
to the fact that “people alone among animals can 
speak [and] people can give accounts of what they 
are doing, disambiguating their actions and justi-
fying them by reference to rules, conventions and 
customs” (Ibid., p. 25). Because language is a major 
instrument in many human activities, then study-
ing the uses of this instrument would be a way of 
studying these activities: “Through the mediation 
of language there is an unbroken continuum be-
tween thought and action” (Ibid., p. 12). Following 
the discursive approach, the researcher “is con-
cerned predominantly with language in use as the 
accomplishment of acts or as attempts of their ac-
complishments”(Ibid., p. 58). The discursive ap-
proach is based on ontology totally different from 
that inherited from the Newtonian mechanics. 
What we have to investigate in social sciences — 
economics is (or has to be) a social science — are 
not things and events, but discourses consisting of 
speech acts. Instead to look for causal relations, 
social scientists (including economists) have to 
try to reveal rules and supporting story lines (see 
Fig. 1). In order to do it “the experimenter or the 
observer has to enter into a discourse with the 
people being studied and to try to appreciate the 
shape of the subject’s cognitive world”[27, p. 21].
The researcher has “to know what a situation 
means to a person and not just what the situation 
is (say, according to a description in terms of its 
physical characteristics as these are seen by an ob-
server) if we are to understand what that person 
is doing” (Ibid., p. 21). For this kind of research, it 
does not matter where and even when something 
was said but what really matters, it is who said 
that. Institutional or social knowledge is not uni-
versal; it relates to concerned communities. That 
is why the people to be contacted have to have the 
social knowledge linked with phenomena under 
study. In this sense ‘array of people’ means people 
from a certain appropriate community. For exam-
ple, in order to study financial markets, it is neces-
sary to contact financial professionals like traders 
and not graduate students of economics as it takes 
place in the so-called ‘experimental economics’. 
At the same time, ‘array of people’ means a sample 
from a target community. The choice of the peo-
ple in the sample and its size made in the frame-
work of the discursive approach are done in a to-
tally different way in comparison with the mech-
anistic approach. The researcher contacts people 
who are willing to share their social knowledge. 
The size of the sample (number of people con-
tacted) is determined by the so-called ‘theoreti-
cal saturation’, when the researcher learns noth-
ing new by additional people contacted from the 
target community. 
Most of the content of this paper is based on 
Figure 2. Initially, it was presented to Russian 
economists in a largely disseminated text [28], 
to participants of a EAEPE conference [29], and 
to French heterodox economists [30]. No one of 
these communities paid any attention to this fig-
ure. I am afraid that the same fate could be re-
served for the present paper. Without understand-
ing and accepting the Figure 2, the assimilation of 
the text of this paper becomes impossible. Figure 2 
in this text is not just a decoration but represents 
its central concept. The upper vertex of the trian-
gle expresses the idea of Jean Piaget that it is pos-
sible to know an object only by acting on it and by 
transforming it. Figure 3 adds the Piagetian and 
Vygotskian dimension of language in these ‘act-
ing’ and ‘transforming’. The left lower vertex of 
the triangle in Figure 2 shows, on the one hand, 
the Peircean social character of scientific research, 
and, on the other hand, it underlines the role of 
power relations in the functioning of academic 
communities with a special emphasis on influ-
ences coming from outside of these communities. 
2. On constructivist history of economics
Mark Blaug, the author of the popular text-
books on the history [1] and methodology [31] of 
economics declared in his article entitled “Why 
I am not a constructivist: confession of an unre-
pentant Popperian” that there is “the tension be-
tween the methodology of science and the his-
tory of science” and that “it is impossible to study 
the history of science without some notion, how-
ever, crude, of the difference between science and 
non-science” [32, p. 109]. He developed his his-
tory of economics from the point of view of the 
rhetoric of popperian post-positivism. Those, who 
would like to try to study the history of economics 
from the constructivist point of view, should un-
derstand the main feature of its methodology, the 
Table 1
Two ontologies [27, p. 29]
Ontologies Locative systems Entities Relations
Newtonian Space and time Things and events Causality
Discursive Arrays of people Speech acts Rules and story lines
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role of resistance, which was indicated in the first 
section of this article, and the discursive nature of 
it[33]. Unfortunately, at present economists do not 
understand them. D. Wade Hands in his book [3] 
quoted one of the prominent constructivist schol-
ars, Karin Knorr Cetina 1, who underlined the cru-
cial role of resistance of the research object to re-
searcher inside the experimental situation, but did 
not notice that inside it the object of study and re-
searcher with her/his instruments cannot be sepa-
rated. He relates constructivism to relativism ask-
ing the question to what degree the constructivism 
“endorse the view that the objects and theories of 
science are completely constituted by human and 
social factors, leaving no role for objective nature 
in the determination of scientific beliefs?” (Ibid., 
pp. 176-177). Hands certainly sympathized with 
“an effort to salvage scientific rationality and nor-
mative epistemology from the threat of relativism 
and social constructivism” (Ibid., p. 367).
E. Roy Weintraub, in his historical studies[4; 
35; 36], does not pay any attention to the na-
ture of resistance of the research object to econ-
omists. In fact, mathematical economists consid-
ered by him did not experience at all this kind of 
resistance. In addition Weintraub with his co-au-
thor Till Düppelimit, the community of evaluators 
exclusively to members of the economists’ profes-
sion. Weintraub and Düppe rightly affirm that the 
Cowles Commission played a crucial role in the 
transformation of the profession of economists 
in the profession of mathematical economists 2, 
but they cannot accept the conclusion of Philip 
Mirowski[36a]that after 1947 “Cowles [had to] at-
tend to its political priorities”, because Cowles 
was connected by contracts and ideas to RAND, 
which was “a cold war (anti-communist) institu-
tion”, and in this way “Cowles was corrupted by 
the military-industrial complex”. The list of lit-
erature (References) of Weintraub’s and Düppe’s 
working paper [35] contains the book by Amadae 
1 “All of us constructivists, I think, are what they call ontolog-
ical realists: We believe in the existence of the material world 
“out there,” and we believe in the fact that this material world 
offers resistance when we act upon it. It will resist; we can’t 
just do everything with it. So in that sense we are all realists. ... 
Negotiating, for example, when they can stop the measurement, 
at what point they’ve got enough data, and at what degree or po-
sition they can say, “Now it is real!” ... This interpretative flex-
ibility ... prompts me to doubt that you can ever get at the real 
world as it really is. You can get resistances in the laboratory; but 
in order for these resistances to make sense, they have to be in-
terpreted. The very moment you interpret them, you enter the 
realm of the social world” [34, pp. 184–185].
2 In France between 2000 and 2011,84,2 % of recruited univer-
sity professors of economics were mathematical economists (Le 
Monde, 3 April 2014). 
S.M.[37] Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy. The 
Cold War Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism, 
but I did not find any quotation or reference to this 
book inside this working paper. It is quite natural 
because this book would confirm the Mirowski’s 
conclusion. After the presentation by Weintraub 
and Düppe of a chapter of their future book [36] 
at the 2012 ESHET Conference, in which they em-
phasized that the first Bank of Sweden Prize in 
Memory of Alfred Nobel in 1969 was a clear sign 
of the success of the Cowles’ culture in economics, 
I asked Weintraub, whether they investigated the 
process of the creation of this prize and the pro-
cess of attribution of prizes. The answer was “no”. 
In fact, this prize has nothing in common with the 
Nobel Prize and can be characterized as an intel-
lectual fraud 3. 
The crucial role in the communities of evalu-
ators (see Fig. 2 above) of political and economic 
actors from outside of communities of economists 
at the period of creation of profession of econo-
mists in 19th century was quite well investigated 
by American historians Elizabeth Sage and Mary 
Furner. French political economists of the 19th 
century saw an important opportunity for profes-
sionalization of their discipline. In order to get 
“scientific status and power”, the discipline “pro-
tected itself from unwanted knowledge”, “elevated 
particular types of knowledge and disqualified oth-
ers” [38, p. 6].Unwanted knowledge primarily con-
cerned the social question: “It was industrialists 
who offered the descriptions of la question social 
and proposals for its solution that economists in 
turn studied, promoted and grafted onto their sci-
ence” (Ibid. p. 7). In order to do it, they relied upon 
fictional “Adam Smith and Jean-Baptiste Say, who 
they invented” (Ibid., p. 19) by ignoring in their 
teachings everything that contradicted the lais-
sez-faire principle. The French government sup-
ported economists in this activity. The following 
quotation from a report dated 1864 of the French 
Ministerof Education, Victor Duruy, to Emperor 
Napoleon III on the creation ofthe Department of 
Political Economyat Paris Faculty of Law shows 
governmental involvement in spreading ideas of 
economists as justifications of the existing so-
cial order: ‘Your Majesty once addressed these 
words to the national industry exhibitors: “Spread 
among your workers the sound doctrines of politi-
cal economy”. You, Sir, also claimed thatthe duty of 
government is to propagate these necessary con-
cepts, which, according to the Englishminister of 
that time, saved England from socialism. This ne-
3 http://exiledonline.com/the-nobel-prize-in-economics-there-
is-no-nobel-prize-in-economics.
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cessity proclaimed by the Emperor fourteen years 
ago, the country recognizes today. Public opinion 
demands that unfortunate gap in our general ed-
ucational system is filled, and several cities have 
already claimed the opening of political economy 
courses’ [39, p. 43-44].
The similar situation took place in the United 
States: «members of so-called clerical school of 
academic economists such as Francis Bowen, John 
Bascom, and Arthur Latham Perry worked closely 
with a group of wealthy and prominent men of 
affairs that included Amasa Walker, David Ames 
Wells, Edward Atkinson, Horace White, Gamaliel 
Bradford, Charles F. Dunbar, John Murray Forbes, 
and Joseph Ropes. Their common goal was the in-
stallation of laissez-faire as an American system 
of economics. Walker, Perry, Bascom, and Bowen 
wrote the standard economics texts of the 1860s 
and 1870s»[40, p. 37].As Mary Furner has shown, 
the most decisive factor in the evolution of 
American economics at the turn of the 19th and 
20th centuries was a political one. She indicated 
that academic economists were subject to an in-
creasing “external control (such as boards of trus-
tees and university administrators, or state leg-
islatures in the case of public universities)” dis-
suading them from working in favour of social re-
forms. British economist Bob Coats indicates, that 
“it is easy to understand why the shift of empha-
sis from teaching of established truths to the ad-
vancement of knowledge and the investigation 
of current problems was liable to generate fric-
tions between the social scientists and certain 
segments of their audience” [41, p. 439]. He ex-
plained these frictions in the following way: “The 
late nineteenth century was a time of disturbing 
economic, social, and political tensions, and the 
fact that the business community was generally 
getting a bad press when the economists were un-
dertaking more thorough studies of their activi-
ties increased the likelihood that even the most 
objective and impartial enquiries would furnish 
ammunition for the innumerable critics of con-
temporary capitalism … Laissez-faire and con-
servative social Darwinism were still the ruling 
beliefs among members of the social and business 
elites, whereas many of the younger social scien-
tists were reformers who regarded uninhibited 
individualism and unfettered competition as the 
cause of many, if not most, current economic and 
social evils … As might be expected, in some quar-
ters such views were regarded as dangerously rad-
ical, and tensions mounted within the academic 
community as businessmen increasingly replaced 
clergymen on college and university boards of 
trustees” (Ibid., pp. 439-440).
French-American sociologist Marion Fourcade 
indicates: “The first American [economics] text-
books were written by clergymen, and a religious 
understanding of economic activity was pervasive. 
Capitalism and the laws of political economy were 
thought to be in harmony with the laws of God 
and consistent with the higher purpose of moral 
elevation” [42, p. 64]. Later this type of econom-
ics was welcome by American businessmen who 
“increasingly replaced clergymen on college and 
university boards of trustees”: “University leaders 
(presidents and boards alike) often favoured [eco-
nomics and other social sciences] as ‘secular sub-
stitutes for religion’ and saw in them a continua-
tion of the old courses in moral philosophy” (Ibid., 
p. 66). Fourcade underlines that in the United 
States “during the wave of academic freedom cases 
that spanned from the 1890s to the 1910s, many 
economists came under sharp public attack for 
promoting views that offended powerful constit-
uencies in matters as varied as the labour move-
ment, free silver coinage, public utility franchises, 
or fiscal policy” (Ibid., p. 79). This type of political 
attacks “drove them to confine their scholarship 
to ‘safe’ intellectual grounds”. Neoclassical eco-
nomics and especially in its mathematical form 
was ideal for serving such ground. That is the rea-
son why it became an “attractive research strat-
egy by American economists, especially by the 
younger generations who had to create a position 
for themselves” (Ibid., pp. 79-80).
Now, the constructivist institutionalism in po-
litical science “draws attention to the role of busi-
ness in proselytizing and sponsoring new and/or 
alternative economic theories” [43, p. 68]. Düppe 
and Weintraub ignore it totally. It is interesting to 
compare the Düppe-Weintraub’s vision of the post-
war American economics profession with the vi-
sion of the same period by one of the leaders of 
heterodox economics, Frederic Lee: “In the post-
war years, three different forces affected the land-
scape of American economics. The most dramatic 
of these was the anticommunist hysteria that si-
lenced an entire generation of radical and progres-
sive American academics, including economists. 
Moreover, the emerging conservative pro-busi-
ness anti-government political and social climate 
affected liberal economists in terms of what they 
taught and what they wrote in textbooks. The final 
force was the modernization movement where eco-
nomic departments consciously redesigned their 
programs to ensure that the most up-to-date ver-
sions of neoclassical economic theory were taught 
using the appropriate mathematical tools. As a re-
sult, all that was taught in this post-war period was 
neoclassical economic theory while the descrip-
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tive-Institutional oriented approach became less 
emphasized and nearly disappeared” [43a, p. 35]. 
He describes it as a period when universities “ad-
ministrators actively co-operated with the FBI and 
in many cases asked the FBI to vet potential hires, 
professors going up for tenure, and all tenured 
faculty and make recommendations about hiring 
and firing”, when some university “academic staff 
for a variety of reasons …were American Legion 
and FBI informants and collaborators while oth-
ers feared reprisal by the university administra-
tion”, and finally when “many of the professional 
associations to which academics belonged either 
collaborated with the FBI, such as the American 
Anthropological Association and the American 
Economic Association (AEA)” (Ibid., p. 37). In order 
“to avoid the withdrawal of research funds or es-
cape attacks, harassment, social ostracism, or the 
inevitable dismissal or denial of tenure, many pro-
gressive academics left academia voluntarily, took 
academic positions outside the United States, re-
stricted and censored the content of their lectures 
(such as not teaching Keynesian economics or as 
not to appear pacifistic, atheistic, or unpatriotic) 
since classes were monitored by students and po-
lice informers, advised graduate students to do safe, 
conventional dissertations so as to avoid red-bait-
ing from committee members, avoided talking to 
student groups about socialism, and/or at the least 
metaphorically voluntarily blowing their brains out 
by re-directing their own research and publications 
to safe, more conventional areas” (Ibid.). This kind 
of history of economics describes very well the het-
erogeneous composition of the community of eval-
uators where decisive influences concerning des-
tiny of ideas/theories come from outside of a com-
munity of academic economists. At the same time 
“A History of Heterodox Economics” by Frederic 
Lee shows also very well that heterodox economists 
deal with degenerated types of experimental situa-
tions where the research object cannot resist to the 
researcher because of its absence: all ideas/theories 
of heterodox economists come from their minds a 
priori without any real interaction between the re-
searcher and the research object. 
The constructivist approach to the history of 
science consists not only of the declaration that 
scientific ideas and theories are human construc-
tions but also that these constructions are made 
by researchers on the basis of direct interactions 
between them and research objects in the frame-
work of experimental situations constructed by 
researchers. Constructivists like Bruno Latour [11] 
and Karin Knorr Cetina [44] “discovered” this un-
alienable feature of scientific research by making 
anthropological type of studies of real scientific 
practices. This unalienable feature of scientific re-
search provides us with the notion of the differ-
ence between science and non-science. Certainly 
it is not the notion used by E. Roy Weintraub and 
Frederic S. Lee: for the former, as for the major-
ity of mainstream economists, the science is there 
where they apply mathematics; for the latter, as 
advocate of critical realism based on dualism, the 
science is there where they are looking for causal-
ities on the basis of abstractions and not on the 
basis of interactions with objects of study in the 
framework of experimental situations. 
(Part II of the article will be published in the next issue of the journal)
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